When utilities are additive, we uncovered in our previous paper [1] many similarities but also surprising differences in the behavior of the familiar Competitive rule (with equal incomes), when we divide (private) goods or bads.The rule picks in both cases the critical points of the product of utilities (or disutilities) on the efficiency frontier, but there is only one such point if we share goods, while there can be exponentially many in the case of bads.
Introduction
In our previous paper [1] we consider fair division of (private, divisible) items under linear preferences, represented for convenience by additive utilities. We explain there the appeal of this domain restriction for the practical implementation of division rules vindicated by theoretical analysis. We focus there on the Competitive Rule (aka Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide the items, and contrast its behavior when we divide goods (assets, such as family heirlooms, real estate, land, stocks), and when we divide bads (chores, workloads, liabilities, noxious substances or facilities). Several normative properties of this rule are identical in both contexts, e. g., No Envy and a simple version of Maskin Monotonicity that we call Independence of Lost Bids. However the unexpected finding is that several aspects of the rule are very different in the two contexts: dividing bads is not a mirror image of dividing goods. The Competitive Rule picks a unique welfare profile when it divides goods, but for dividing bads it often proposes many (up to exponentially many in the number of agents and bads) allocations with different welfare consequences; in the former case the competitive welfare profile is continuous in the marginal rates of substitution, in the latter case such continuity is not feasible. Also the rule makes every participant benefit from an increase in the goods to divide, a monotonicity property that is out of reach when we divide bads.
Here we generalize this analysis to fair division problems involving (non disposable) mixed items, i. e., both goods and bads, or even items about which participants disagree whether they are good or bad. An inheritance may include good and bad real estate (e. g., heavily mortgaged or not), divorcing couples must allocate jewellery as well as obnoxious pets, workers sharing a multiple jobs relish certain jobs and loath others; and managers facing the division of onerous tasks may deliberately add some desirable items to "sweeten" the deal of the workers.
For a start we show that, upon adapting the standard definition to allow for the coexistence of positive and negative prices and for individual budgets of arbitrary sign, the Competitive Rule is always non empty, and its basic normative properties (No Envy, Independence of Lost Bids, Core from Equal Split 1 ) are preserved.
2
The status quo ante situation with nothing to divide delivers in our model zero utility to each participant. If all items are good, any feasible allocation brings (weakly) positive utilities, so that the arrival of the "manna" is good news for everyone; similarly the task of dividing non disposable, undesirable items is a chore for everyone bringing weakly negative utilities to all. With mixed items, some good, some bad, allocations where some participants enjoy positive utility and others negative utility are of course feasible, and some interpretations of fairness pick such divisions (see an example below). Remarkably the Competitive Rule never does: in any problem mixing goods and bads, either it weakly improves the welfare of all agents above the status quo ex ante, or it weakly decrease everyone's welfare below this benchmark. The rule enforces a strong solidarity among agents: the task of dividing any bundle of non disposable items is either unanimously good news or unanimously bad news.
The result We call a problem positive if the zero utility profile is strictly below the efficient utility frontier; negative if it is strictly above; and null if it is on this frontier. In a positive problem the Competitive Rule (CR for short) picks the unique allocation maximizing the Nash product of utilities among positive profiles: it behaves as if there are only goods, selects a unique utility profile, and enjoys the same regularity and monotonicity properties as in the all-goods case (within the class of positive problems). In a negative problem the CR picks all the critical points of the product of disutilities over the efficient negative profiles: it behaves as if there are only bads, in particular it may pick many different utility profiles, and loses its regularity and monotonicity properties. In a null problem the rule implements the null utility profile.
Note that the familiar Fair Share utility still sets a lower bound on each agent competitive utility, but these utilities are no longer a useful benchmark as they can be of different signs in the same problem (see an example below).
Some simple examples Here is a two-agent, two-item example where a is a good and b is a bad:
There is one unit of each item to share. So a is very good for agent 1 compared to b, while b is very bad relative to a for agent 2.
3 Fair Share utilities obtain by giving one half unit of each item to each agent: U In Section 5 we compute the competitive division in a sequence of problems with two agents, two bads, and a third item starting as a good and becoming increasingly bad. The initial problem is positive, then becomes negative; the number of competitive allocations takes all values from 1 to 4.
We stress another key difference between the Competitive and Egalitarian Rules, implied by Independence of Lost Bids. If an object a is a good for some agents and a bad for others, efficiency implies that only the former agents eat it. The CR ignores the detailed disutilities of the latter agents: nothing changes if we set those disutilities to zero, so that a becomes a good. This means that we need only to consider problems where items are either (at least weakly) good for everyone, or (at least weakly) bad for everyone. Obviously this simplification does not apply to the ER.
The model
The set of agents is N with cardinality n, that of objects is A. A problem is P = (N, A, u ∈ R N ×A ) where the utility matrix u has no null column. With the notation z M = i∈M z i , and e B for the vector in R B with e B b = 1 for allb, we define a feasible allocation as z ∈ R N ×A + such that z N = e A . Let F(P) be the set of feasible allocations, and Φ(P) the corresponding set of utility profiles. We always omit P if it is clear from the context. We call a feasible utility profile efficient if it is not Pareto dominated 4 ; also a feasible allocation is efficient if it implements an efficient utility profile.
The following two partitions, of N and A respectively, are critical:
When no confusion may arise, we call an object in A + good, one in A − bad, and one in A 0 neutral. Definition 1: For any problem P a competitive division is a triple (z ∈ F, p ∈ R A , β ∈ {−1, 0, +1}) where z is the competitive allocation, p is the price and β the budget. The allocation z i maximizes i's utility in the budget set B(p, β) = {y i ∈ R A + |p · y i ≤ β}:
Moreover z i minimizes i's wealth in her demand set
The Competitive Rule selects at each problem P the set CR(P) of all competitive allocations.
In addition to the usual demand property (1), we insist that an agent spends as little as possible for her competitive allocation. This requirement appears already in [2] : in its absence some satiated agents in N − may inefficiently eat some objects useless to themselves but useful to others. For instance in the two agents-two item problem u = 6 2 0 −1 the inefficient allocation z = 1/3 1 2/3 0 meets (1) for the prices p = (
2 ) and budget β = 1. However z 2 = (0, 0) guarantees the same (zero) utility to agent 2 and costs zero, so it fails (2). The only competitive division according to the Definition is z = 1 1 0 0 for p = (
2 ). Check that in a competitive division we have
If the first statement fails an agent who likes a would demand an infinite amount; if the second fails no one would demand b. If the third fails with p a > 0 the only agents who demand a have u ia = 0, so that eating some a violates (2); if it fails with p a < 0 an agent such that u ia = 0 gets an arbitrarily cheap demand by asking large amounts of a, so (2) fails again.
Here is another consequence of (2), the importance of which is illustrated by the above example:
Indeed if i eats some a ∈ A + and u ia = 0, she gets a cheaper competitive demand by ignoring a; and if u ia < 0 her allocation is not competitive (recall p a > 0).
We recall three standard normative properties of an allocation z ∈ F(P). It is Non Envious iff u i ·z i ≥ u i ·z j for all i, j; it guarantees the Fair Share utilities iff u i ·z i ≥ u i ·( A there is at least one i ∈ S such that u i · z i ≥ u i · y i . When we divide goods competitive allocations meet these three properties, even in the much larger Arrow-Debreu preference domain. Lemma 1 A competitive allocation is efficient; it meets No Envy, guarantees the Fair Share utilities, and is in the Weak Core from Equal Split. Proof. Efficiency. The classic argument by contradiction can be adapted here. Let z be a competitive allocation Pareto inferior to the feasible allocation y. Some agent i * strictly prefers y i * to z i * which implies p · z i * < p · y i * by (1) . So if we show p · z i ≤ p · y i for all i, we contradict z N = y N by summing up these inequalities. Note that we can assume that y itself is efficient which will be useful below.
First we have p · z i = β for i ∈ N + , or i could buy more of an object in A + he likes; moreover i prefers strictly z i to any y i such that p · y i < β, and weakly if
We distinguish two cases. If β = 0, +1 we have u j · z j = 0 (the best feasible utility for j) and u j · y j = 0 as well. At z agent j can only consume objects in A 0 : by (4) j eats no item in A + and eating in A − strictly lowers her utility; agent j eats no object in A + at y either by efficiency of y, and by u j · y j = 0 she eats nothing in A − as well. Objects in A 0 are free ((3)) so p · z j = p · y j = 0. Now if β = −1 an agent j in N − must eat some objects in A − that he dislikes hence his competitive demand z j has p · z j = β and as above he strictly prefers z j to y j if p · y j < β: so p · z j ≤ p · y j as desired. Other properties. No Envy is clear and it implies Fair Share by additivity of utilities. We use again the standard argument to check the Weak Core property. Assume coalition S ⊂ N has an objection y to the competitive division (z, p, β) where everybody in S strictly benefits. So y ∈ R S×A + and u i · z i < u i · y i for all i ∈ S. If β = 0, +1, this inequality is impossible for i ∈ N − because u i · z i = 0 (see above), so S ⊆ N + . Then we sum over S the inequalities p · z i < p · y i to get A to make everyone in S weakly better off and at least one agent strictly more. This is because "equal split" gives resources to the agents in N − that they have no use for. Say three agents share one unit of item a with u 1 = u 2 = 1, u 3 = −1. Here CR splits a between agents 1 and 2, which coalition {1, 3} blocks by giving 2 3 of a to agent 1. Remark 2: It is easy to check that CR meets Independence of Lost Bids, the translation of Maskin Monotonicity under linear preferences: see the precise definition in [1] . Just as in Proposition 2 of that paper, CR is characterized by, essentially, combining this property with Efficiency.
The result
The key to classify our problems when N and A are given is the relative position of the set of feasible utility profiles Φ and the cone Γ(N ) = R Definition 2 We call the problem P = (N, A, u)
We fix P and check that these three cases are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This amounts to show that Φ ∩ Γ * = ∅ and Φ ∩ ∂Γ = ∅ together imply Φ ∩ Γ = {0}. Pick U non zero in Φ ∩ ∂Γ and derive a contradiction. Let U i > 0 for the agents in P ⊂ N + and U j = 0 for those in Q = N + P . If some i ∈ Q eats some a he likes (u ia > 0), he must also eat some b he dislikes (u ib < 0): then let someone in P take a small amount of b from i and we get a new U ∈ Φ ∩ ∂Γ where P is larger than P . If no j in Q eats any a she likes (so she does not eat any she dislikes either), we pick any i ∈ Q and an item a she likes; a must be eaten at U exclusively by some agents in P ∪ N − ; if some j ∈ P eats a we let j give a small amount of a to i and we have found U ∈ Φ ∩ ∂Γ with a larger P ; if some k in N − eats some a we have u ka = 0 so again k can give his share of a to i and P increases. Repeating this construction until P = N + we reach U ∈ Φ ∩ Γ * , the desired contradiction.
Given a smooth function f and a closed convex C we say that x ∈ C is a critical point of f in C if the supporting hyperplane of the upper contour of f at x supports C as well:
This holds in particular if x maximizes or minimizes f in C.
In the statement we write Φ ef f for the set of efficient utility profiles, and R N = for the interior of R N − . Theorem Fix a problem P = (N, A, u) . i) The problem P has a competitive division with a positive budget if and only if it is positive. In this case an allocation is competitive iff it maximizes the product Π N+ U i over Φ ∩ Γ * ; thus the corresponding utility profile is unique, positive in N + and zero in N − .
ii) The problem P has a competitive division with a negative budget if and only if it is negative. In this case an allocation is competitive iff it is a critical point of the product
All utilities are negative in any competitive allocation. iii) The problem P has a competitive allocation with a zero budget if and only if it is null. In this case an allocation is competitive iff its utility profile is zero.
Note that the Theorem implies in particular that CR(P) is non empty for all P.
Proof
First we give a closed form description of the competitive demands per Definition 1, i. e., the solutions of (1) plus (2).
Lemma 2 Fix P a budget β ∈ {−1, 0, +1} and a price p such that p a > 0 in A + , p b < 0 in A − , and p a = 0 in A 0 . i) if i ∈ N − and β = 0, +1, the allocation z i ∈ R A + is competitive iff u i · z i = 0 (for instance z i = 0) ii) if i ∈ N − and β = −1, z i ∈ R A + is competitive iff p · z i = −1, z ia = 0 on A + , z ia > 0 on A 0 only if u ia = 0, and
iii) if i ∈ N + the problem (1) has a bounded solution iff
Then the allocation z i is competitive iff p · z i = β, and z i meets (5) and the two following properties:
Statement i) is clear upon noticing that eating some object in A 0 is free so that (2) holds. For ii) observe that to meet the budget constraint i must be buying some b ∈ A − ; if i buys some a ∈ A + she can increase her utility by buying less of b and of a; and (2) still holds because objects in A 0 are free. Property (5) simply says that she buys objects in A − with the smallest disutility per unit of (fiat) money.
For statement iii) pick agent i in N + and note that a budget balanced purchase of both objects a ∈ A + and b ∈ A − increases strictly i's utility iff uia pa > |u ib | |p b | , in which case (1) has no bounded solution. As already noted in the proof of Lemma 1, i can buy some object he likes in A + with any slack budget, therefore p · z i = β, which implies (2). Properties (5) follow as for agents in N − and (7) is similar. Finally if i eats both a ∈ A + and b ∈ A − , inequality uia pa < |u ib | |p b | implies that a budget neutral reduction of z ia and z ib increases U i : thus we need (8) as well.
Proof of the Theorem Step 1 : Statement i ). Let P = (N, A, u) be a positive problem. We show that the maximization of the Nash product on Φ ∩ Γ finds a Competitive allocation with a positive budget. As Φ ∩ Γ is compact and convex, there is a unique U * maximizing in Φ ∩ Γ the product Π N+ U i ; clearly U * i > 0 for all i ∈ N + . Let z * be an allocation implementing U * . By efficiency the items in A 0 are only eaten by agents in N + and/or N − , who do not care about them (u ia = 0); this implies ∀i ∈ N + : u iA0 · z * iA0 = 0 (9) (with the notation u iB · z iB = B u ib z ib ). By efficiency the items in A + are eaten in full by N + (property (4)); ditto for the items in A − because for such items and any i ∈ N − , we have u ia < 0 and U * i = 0. We define prices as follows:
and p a = 0 on A 0 . Pick any a ∈ A + and i ∈ N + eating a (such i exists by the argument above): then u ia > 0 by efficiency, so the FOC of the maximization program implies
for all j ∈ N + . This is property (7). Checking (5) is similar: assume i ∈ N + eats b ∈ A − and recall u ib < 0, so the FOCs give
for all j ∈ N + . Now we fix i ∈ N + and apply (7), (5):
Summing up numerator and denominator over the support of z * i (the items he eats) and invoking (9) as well as p a = 0 on A 0 , we get
as required by Lemma 2. If A − is non empty, there is at least one agent i ∈ N + eating a ∈ A + and b ∈ A − . For any such i property (11) 
Step 2: Statement i ). Suppose the problem P = (N, A, u) has a competitive division (z, p, +1). We show that P is positive and z maximizes the Nash product as in Step 1. Because z i = 0 is in the budget set, all agents in N − must get zero utility. If they consume anything, it must be an object in A 0 by assumption (4). Each i in N + can buy some amount of any object, so at z her utility is positive: U i = u i · z i > 0. Therefore P is positive.
Fix i ∈ N + and recall objects in A 0 , if any, have zero price (assumption (3)). Thus if i eats some a ∈ A 0 we have u ia = 0, otherwise i benefits by simply stop eating a. This gives u iA0 · z iA0 = 0 (as in (9)), and p A0 · z iA0 = 0 as well.
We also know that p is positive on A + and negative on A − , and that p · z i = 1 for all i ∈ N + (by efficiency of z). Write the sets of objects i eats in
A + (i) is non empty because U i > 0 (A − (i) can be empty). By Lemma 2 uia pa is constant on A + (i), and equal to |u ib | |p b | on A − (i) if the latter is non empty. Thus this common ratio is also
(where the first equality uses u iA0 · z iA0 = p A0 · z iA0 = 0). Therefore
These two facts together give for all i ∈ N + :
From this we derive that U maximizes Π N+ U i in Φ ∩ Γ, or equivalently that it is critical for the product of utilities in Φ ∩ Γ: the restriction to N + of any feasible utility profile is below the hyperplane supporting Π N+ U i at (the restriction of ) U :
for all U ∈ Φ :
Pick z ∈ F implementing U and use (13) to compute (recalling that p is zero on A 0 )
Step 3: Statement ii ). Let P = (N, A, u) be a negative problem. We show there exists a critical point U * of the product
The profile U * we construct maximizes this product on Φ ef f ∩ R N − , and any allocation z * implementing it is competitive.
We pick an allocation z * implementing U * and mimick the argument in Step 1 above. While objects in A + are still eaten exclusively by N + , those in A − are eaten by anyone (and everyone eats at least one object in A − ). If a ∈ A + and z * ia > 0 for i ∈ N + , a transfer of some a from i to j ∈ N + leaves the allocation on the same side of H as Φ, i. e., below: this implies We have u i · e A < 0 for every i ∈ N , else the allocation z i = e A yields utilities in Γ. Consider the set F of utility profiles dominated by Φ:
This set is closed and convex, and contains all points in R N − that are sufficiently far from the origin:
A is dominated by the utility profile of
Fix τ ≥ 0 and consider the upper contour of the Nash product at τ :
For sufficiently large τ the closed convex set K(τ ) is contained in F . Let τ 0 be the minimal τ with this property. Negativity of P implies that F is bounded away from 0 so that τ 0 is strictly positive. By definition of τ 0 the set K(τ 0 ) touches the boundary of F at some U * with strictly negative coordinates. Let H be a hyperplane supporting F at U * . By the construction, this hyperplane also supports K(τ 0 ), therefore U * is a critical point of the Nash product on F : that is, U * maximizes i∈N Ui |U * i | over all U ∈ F . So U * belongs to Pareto frontier of F , which is clearly contained in the Pareto frontier of Φ Thus U * is a critical point of the Nash product on Φ and belongs to Φ ef f ∩ R N = . Any U in the interior of
maximizes the Nash product on Φ ef f ∩ R N − . Remark 3: Note that the supporting hyperplane H to Φ at U * is unique because it is also a supporting hyperplane to K(τ 0 ) that is unique. This means that U * belongs to a face of a polytope Φ of maximal dimension.
Step 4: Statement ii ). Suppose the problem P = (N, A, u) has a competitive division (z, p, −1). We show that P is negative and the corresponding utility profile U is a critical point of the product
The utility of any agent in N − at z is negative: goods in A 0 are free ((3)), he does not eat any object in A + ((4)), and his budget is negative. Applying Lemma 2 to an agent in N + we see, as in Step 2, that the ratio uia pa is constant on A + (i), and equal to
By Lemma 1 the negative profile U is efficient, so Φ cannot intersect and P is negative.
We derive now the criticality of U for Π N |U i | much like we did in Step 2. The difference is that now everyone eats some object in A − , and i in N + may or may not eat some object in A + (but i in N − still doesn't).
From 
The criticality of U ∈ Φ ef f ∩ R N = for Π N |U i | in Φ means now that all feasible utility profiles are below the hyperplane supporting Π N |U i | at U for all U ∈ Φ :
(but this time U does not maximize Π N |U i | on all of Φ). The derivation of this inequality from (14) proceeds exactly as in Step 2.
Step 5: Statement iii). Let P = (N, A, u) be a null problem. We show there exists a price p such that (z, p, 0) is competitive iff u i · z i = 0 for all i. As Φ ∩ Γ = {0} we can separate the projection of Φ on R N+ from R N+ + : there exists λ ∈ R N+ + {0} such that i∈N+ λ i U i ≤ 0 for all U ∈ Φ. If λ i = 0 for some i ∈ N + we pick j ∈ N + such that λ j > 0 and the allocation where j eats an object she likes and i eats all the rest yields a contradiction. Thus λ is strictly positive.
Pick any z * ∈ F implementing U = 0: it is efficient therefore u iA0 · z * iA0 = 0. We have
We define the price p as ∀a ∈ A + : p a = max The definition of p implies p a ≥ λ i u ia and |p b | ≤ λ i |u ib | for all i ∈ N + , a ∈ A + , b ∈ A − . This implies (6) at once; together with (15) it gives (7); the proof of (5) and (8) is similar.
Step 6: Statement iii ). Suppose the problem P = (N, A, u) has a competitive division (z, p, 0). We show that P is null.
Let U be the utility profile of z. Clearly U i = 0 for i ∈ N − . Fix i ∈ N + such that z i = 0: because p · z i = 0 (Lemma 2) i must eat at least one object in A + and one in A − . By Lemma 2 again we have and we conclude U = 0. As U ∈ Φ ef f the intersection Φ ∩ Γ contains nothing more.
Appendix: a monotonic sequence of examples
We have N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c} and a b c u 1 −1 −3 λ u 2 −2 −1 λ and λ takes all integer values from 4 to −3. The first two problems, for λ = 4, 3 are positive; for λ = 2 the problem is null, then negative from λ = 1 to −3. 
